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“Role theory and Foreign Policy Analysis: A Case study of Pakistan in Post 9/11 Era”

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ABSTRACT

The attacks on the soil of United States on September 11, 2001 were a turning point in US history. Once again, America commitment diverted to its national security, and the impact of these event on global scale was even more profound. The Us response to these attacks was spontaneous which culminated in US-led Global War on Terror. The United States declared that these attacks were carried out by Al-Qaeda, an international terrorist organization, who are now hosted by Taliban in Afghanistan. The international community at large accepted the US stance and joined the global war against these terrorists, their supports, and even against their sympathizers. The neighboring states of Afghanistan was offered a choice to join the either side of US and allies or these terrorists. Pakistan was no different in such offer either to choose as a front ally state in this GWT or face the consequences. Historically, Pakistan and Afghanistan relation were always in the state of turmoil due to the issue of Durand Line and the Pakistani State extended support to the anti-Afghan government forces especially religiously motivated one. After the rise of Taliban in 1996, Pakistan extended support to the group to pursue the policy of strategic depth and allegedly continue cooperation with Taliban after 9/11, despite of being a front ally state in the US-led imitative against global terrorism. However, on domestic front, Pakistan condemned these attacks and at the same time confirmed to join US-led alliance against this Global War on Terror. This study will explore the role played by Pakistan as Anti-Terrorism Agent in the backdrop of post 9/11 era especially at the time of General Pervaiz Musharraf who adopted such role for Pakistan to combat terrorism at domestic and international front. Consequently, how far such role was achieved and what was the implications of it in the war on terror will be the focus of this study.

Introduction

The attacks on United States of America on September 11, 2001, has been considered the most horrific incident in 21st century. That's why its consequence has been both immediate and long lasting in world politics. The United States once again showed concerns for its national security. Overall, the most striking feature of this event was US commitment to declare the so-called 'war on terror' which was hugely supported by international community against the perpetrators i.e. the Al-Qaeda and their host Taliban Muslim world also condemned these attacks and vowed their support to encounter the manic of terror in each and every way. The impact of this global war against terrorism was on the whole world but the obvious effect was on the neighboring countries which located in the backyard of Afghanistan where the accused Al-Qaeda its supporter Taliban was present. Especially, Pakistan the immediate neighbor of Afghanistan became center of attraction due to this war on terror. Though US mission focus was toward Afghanistan, it is necessary to understand the nature of relation between Pakistan and Afghanistan which was some time friendly and sometime hostile. Gradually, it become clear that US sought the help of Pakistan for its military mission in Afghanistan. Consequently, Pakistan become a front ally state in the coalition against Al-Qaeda and Taliban in the fight of terrorism. Pakistan adopted the role which is known as "Anti-terrorism agent" such role is somehow deviation of Pakistan from its previous role in which it was the "faithful ally" of Afghan Taliban and also from the role of "active independent" to pursue active and independent foreign policy to better serve her national interest while avoiding any external pressure especially from the United States who had not only abandoned Pakistan after Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 but also made hurdles in the way of Pakistan

on many occasion especially in the development of its nuclear program. Domestically, Pakistan condemned these attacks, however its policy shift or role behaviour change

A reversal of Pakistan foreign policy role behaviour toward the United States in the face of attacks in New York on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. In the famous President Bush dictum, "Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists". Pakistan under the military rule of General Musharraf made an alliance with the US against terrorism and with-it Pakistan was relaxed in many issue areas such as nuclear nonproliferation, non-democratic governance, and finance aid sanction. The United States make alliance at such time when democratic government was toppled by military and imposed martial law in the 1999. Pakistan proximity to Afghanistan where the perpetrator of 9/11 take refuge for this reason Pakistan occurred in one of the most conflictual zones in the world. This situation has long lasting impact on the regional stability in particular and larger world in general. The political instability is the permanent feature of Pakistan landscape and its nuclear arsenals need to be secure to fall in the hand of terrorists, poverty alleviation and combating extremism and terrorism also greater challenges. Pakistan adopted a role of anti-terrorism agent and received huge amount from United States approximately U.S.\$15 billion in military and financial aid from year 2002 to 2009. This study examines the foreign policy role of Pakistan while adopting the role of anti-terrorism agent in the US led war on terror especially to better understand how General Pervaiz Musharraf adopted such role in his capacity as leader of Pakistan.

Foreign Policy Analysis:

In a broad sense, foreign policy is the study by different means and ends, which provide understanding and explaining the

processes of foreign policy and the behavior of significant actor in the international system. Foreign policy is a process through which investigation is conducted to examine the behaviour of sovereign state within international system. According to Neack et al., “the central focus of foreign policy analysis is on the intentions, statements and actions of actors - often, but not always, a state - directed towards the external world and the response of other actors to these intentions, statements and actions.” For Neack et al. the decisive factor of foreign policy lies between domestic and international level ranging from individual to national and finally culminate in international level of analysis. Therefore, foreign policy analysis is study from many diverse perspectives. This study may include various entities like state, non-states actors and even sub-state actors. In short, it is the culmination of different level of analysis, incorporating both internal and external demission along with various strategies, polices and actions

Role theory as frame work to study foreign policy

There is a variety of ways to study foreign policy of any country for example Decision-Making Theory, Pre-Theory by Rosenau, Bureaucratic Politics Discourse Analysis The Role theory Social Constructivism and so on. The field of foreign policy usually focus on the study of great power polices. They have the capabilities rich in resources and strong mobilization force whether in the form of bureaucracy or another tool of persuasions. In the comparison to it third world countries are far behind both in strength and focus while studying their foreign policy.

In realistic terms, strong economy and stable political system has huge contribution in the formulation of influential foreign policy, especially in the case of third world states. Other deterministic factors, like potential military force, geostatic advantage

and so on, are not denied they have their contribution in this regard. Combining all these micro and macro elements will enable any third world country to formulate and implement a more influential foreign policy both in regional and international level. Historically, we have many illustrations which would negate this old perception that only great powers or what is called global North is more delighted to demonstrate such a huge impact in the affairs of nations. History tells us that it was Cuba in the 1960s who made a difference not just at the Middle East level but also at the international level. In his foot step there were many other leaders like Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Nehru in India to conduct more influential and effective foreign policy at regional and international levels. Furthermore, there are some problems which was not settled by great powers rather resolved by Third World countries. For instance, it was Algeria who played her role in the American hostage crisis on the eve of post Iranian revolution in 1979 at the time when even some great power failed to do so.

Certainly, lack of capability and resources are not the only obstacle in way of Third World country poor capabilities and limited influence are not the only obstacles when studying foreign policy in Third World states. Finding an appropriate theoretical framework for the study of foreign policy in Third World countries is also a difficult task. Many questions arising while choosing any theoretical framework. Some of them are following:

1. How do we access the reliable data on decision-making in countries like Pakistan?
2. How far is it possible to get close enough to the decision makers in Pakistan to observe their mental and psychological

- capabilities.
3. Can we systematically explain the domestic account of Pakistan which remained passive and instable and how much it will be help to understand the foreign policy of the country?
 4. How much official record is an available for public access in Pakistan?

Moreover, the political discourse of Pakistani leader is how much genuine and help us to understand the actions.

These questions revealed the concerns that any attempt, no matter which theoretical framework to adopt, to understand the foreign policy of Pakistan is not trouble free. Against this background, this article will challenge the hurdle in this way in order to study the foreign policy of Pakistan, is definitely role theory. In other word this article will study the significance of role theory to help us understand the role of anti-terrorism agent adopted by Pakistan in the aftermath of 9/11.

In order to achieve such aim, the article will start with the definition of role theory, then its emergence as theoretical tool in the field of foreign policy and finally the article will attempt to investigate the effectiveness of the role in the study of foreign policy of Pakistan in the backdrop of war on terror.

The Definition of the Role Theory:

We heard many terms in the News outlets, academic circles such as ‘mediator’, ‘neutral’, ‘aggressor’ and so on. These and many such terms are used to indicate some decision and action taken by official of any state. For instance, if we say some state A is mediator in the dispute between state B and C then we meant that state A adopted such polices and actions which will help to resolve the dispute between both conflicting parties. In a broader

sense, role theory is the study of behaviour of any state while using the idea of role. In the realm of foreign policy, policy making elites attributes some responsibilities and commitments to themselves in the regional level and international level. Role theory considers such responsibilities and commitments as roles.

Based on role theory, states can play many roles such Faithful ally, Active Independent, Antiterrorism Agent, etc. A state can play many roles at a time, for instance, Pakistan during 1990s was both faithful ally of Afghan Taliban and endeavor to be active independent when US break ties and also made many hurdles especially in the development of nuclear program after Soviet withdrawal for Afghanistan. Consequently, apply this notion of role like its sociological usage of theatrical metaphor is also relevant to IR in which the world is considered a stage in which each sovereign state has its role(s) to play. However, the focus of this paper is to study the role of Anti-Terrorism Agent adopted by Pakistan.

Historical Evolution of Role Theory:

First time, it was used by sociologists to describe specific role in their interaction with other. However, it was the **K.J Holsti** who for the first time properly introduce the notion in the field of international relation by his concept of national role. He highlighted some 17 types of roles associated with the states. These role conceptions range from active to passive nature in foreign policy.

The work of **Holsti** was a milestone for future study of role theory literature, but despite of it, was criticized by many scholars on the grounds of analytical and methodological basis. Many studies used his method of categorization but at the same time point out insufficiencies in it. For instance, **Shih** declines his typology on logical ground as it is not able to describe human culture in its richness, and not effective while deducing categorization. Similarly, his typology was

also criticized that it mostly depended on Cold War in its role categorization.

Moreover, according to Wish there is two limitation in **Holsti’s** approach. First, he connected state’s national role conception to the activity-passivity scale on international level, starting from the role of ‘bastion of revolution – liberator’ as a highest participation level to the ‘protectee’ as lowest participation level. Additionally, she also points out that **Holsti** failed to provide any correct method of measurement in order to measure involvement or participation in the international system.

On alternative note she suggested a different typology, in which more diverse decisions of foreign policy are included not necessarily related to international participation. In the result of Wish research. she devised 13 different types of different role conception as under title of status, direction of motivation, and practical issue area. Moreover, her division is also helpful while into subgroups provided information why some state chooses particular role and not the other one. In final word one can say that Wish work was improved as compare to **Holsti** to capture a wide range of foreign policy perception.

Throughout history, concerns were raised by different scholars regarding the use of role theory in the field of foreign policy. It is not surprising that the first objection was how we used a theory which evolved in a completely different field of study. This issue of compatibility become more serious when the theory was used to study a different level of analysis. In this regard **Backman** provided an optimistic view that it can be useful to use role theory in the field of international politics despite use of it in the field of psychology and sociology. He showed with the help of examples how scholar can effectively use role theory in order to make sense what they already know. There is another drawback of role theory highlight by two scholars which is also

related to this study. In the study of **Candir and Kaarbo**, they question the role of foreign policy elites, which was also related to the above discussion of different level of analysis. For this reason, it is certain as role theory first of all evolved in the field of sociology and psychology in order to study the role behaviour of an actor mainly individual, as elite comprise of it, then how would be better to applied it on other level of analysis, such as state level. Keeping this in view, **Candir and Kaarbo** failed to provide any convincing argument why policy elites influence policy outcomes would, or in other words why ruling elites stand for entire nation in this regard. Moreover, they also having lack of information as foreign policy ruling elites are the only driving force of foreign policy, if not, then how they got the support of whole society in this regard pertaining to any issue on national and international level.

For the solution of above problem, scholar suggested two different approaches. First, following constructivist school of thought, they suggested that as national role conceptions are socially constructed, so shared by the society. In the second place, if it is even not shared between the society and elites, it is still the policy elites who select such roles though limited in number while acceptable to their voters. This suggestion mostly based on the **Putnam’s** notion of ‘double game’ played by politicians simultaneously one on national level, where they are responsible to explain policy to domestic audience, and other on international level.

Role Theory in the study of foreign policy of Pakistan’s role as Anti- Terrorism Agent in the aftermath of 9/11

In the limelight of role theory one can understand how Pakistan adopted the role of anti-terrorism agent after the attacks on United States of America in 9th September 2001. As earlier

mentioned, that foreign policy is not unidimensional rather there is array of determinants who determine the course of action. Despite of it, role theory will shed light on Pakistan role behaviour and will explore how such role was aspired and enacted. At the time of 9/11 incident Pakistan was under the direct military rule headed by General Pervaiz Musharraf and if one study this era of pre and post 9/11, one will encounter by enormous accounts that he was the sole actor in the Allison’s unitary actor model sense who mainly decided what course of action is necessary in the foreign policy realm without much hesitation or what in role language is said to be vertical and horizontal role contestation. He was pointed by the then PM Nawaz sharif as Chief of Army Staff. However, he turnover the Nawaz’s government in a military coup on 12th October 1999 and took control of power as 4th military general in the history of country. He remained in the power both as President and Chief of Army Staff that’s why he is considered the most powerful military ruler throughout the history of Pakistan. In the wake of 9/11 as he was positioned on two powerful seats, he joined hand with the United States as front ally state in so called war on terror. According to Ms. Shabana Fayyaz, General Musharraf told her that he decided unitarily to participate in US efforts to tackle what is said to be terrorism. How he reached to such decision is the subject matter of this paper and the focus lies how he change the direction of foreign policy or role behaviour of the country from its previous course and adopt a new policy or role. This paper claim that he used the rhetoric of TCA to acquire such role of Anti-Terrorism Agent. Before exploring how such role was adopted it is necessary to briefly discuss above mentioned concepts.

What is Communicative Action Theory (TCA)

Using role theory many scholars stick to the point that structure define role of actors. It is pre-defined scripts who tell actors what to do while neglecting their own ingenuity and self-sufficiency. In contrast, this theory of Communicative action stresses the intersubjective part of actor, for example, engaging agency to go beyond domestic role contestation and alter role expectation. In this section first, the concept of “role” will be discussed which help us to understand that role is not systemic property rather it lies between structure and agency. Then, distinction between a situational/institutional and an actor-related will be highlighted and how CA finds its due argument in the field of international relations. And finally, discuss the possible ways in which CA change role script along other contributing factors and how it is relevant to the current study.

What is the Concept of Role?

Previously, we discussed that role theory emerged in sociological background which postulates that individual or actor has many roles. A person can be a serviceman/woman, a father/mother, a husband/wife, a Pakistani, a Muslim and so on. These roles may be different from each other in their attributes. So, if we assimilate all these roles, we will end up without any distinctive profile. If it is not consistent with individual human being, how it will be satisfactory for collective actors. For this reason, we will give some concrete explanatory property regarding multiple role which enable some distinctive ego to actor means some form of individuality of role enactment and interpretation which help us to understand what particular role he/she is playing. Certainly, the idea of ego part of a role in which actor think of him/herself is close to what other role theorist distinguish as “identity” conception of role. This notion is

useful in three different ways. First, it shows the possibility of role consistency with the supposition by which actor try to keep their role consistent throughout his/her role enactment process, even, if role conflict arises. Second, generally it is expected of actors to perform job according to prescribe role, but individual has given some advantage to act upon what fit in particular environment in which he/she has to operate.

Third, it is useful that we use this concept to investigate the relationship between masses and ruling elites. The basic hypothesis is that there is some resemblance between ego part of role between policy makers and public, for this reason public want that their government perform their part (ego part), while identity is developed in the process of long historical period and it must be constantly reviving within the changing environment. Such situation can lead us to role conflict when others (alter part) develop expectation towards a state (ego part) which is in sheer contrast to public demand according to their identity. The tension might be the result of change in partners polices or international level systemic change as in 2001. When internal and external role enactment demand diverge, it is hard for government to sustain role consistency. Similarly, there is another related problem when ruling elites' identity which are expressively diverse from what masses to believe. This deviation is common in such countries who are run by unitary actors, or in great powers such as United States where bureaucracy's way of governing is great power aspiration while general masses prefer layman foreign policies. The ruling elites in such countries promote a two-level discourse one to external audience which is in opposition to domestic public identity, and other to domestic audience which want to sustain important character of their identity in anarchic international system.

How to identify role?

Answer to such question lies in role location process. A process in which we look the performance of what actor is doing. If we used a word process for it then it has life period which is called role enactment life. Moreover, an explanans are also attached with role which mean why specific action was taken while neglecting alternative possible choices.

Roles are considered “superscript” which are applicable in array of policy fields. Some entities have the leverage such as foreign ministries to rewrite role script according to their demand. So, role is not a straightforward concept as conceived for masses or single individuals. For this reason, role enactment must be comprehensible for general understanding what it means or when it is rewrite or newly writing in its way.

Situational/Institutional vs actor dependent Communicative action in international relations

There are two different ways to discuss role scripts namely actor independent and actor specific. As the former is beyond the scope of this study, therefore, focus will be remained on latter. Although, former will be briefly highlighted due to some clarification in the light of this study. Actor-independent role scripts depend on situational and institutional variables. But such situational and intuitional variables lead to blind valley then CA come into play.

The idea of actor dependent role script lies in the assumption that some actors engage in CA more than others. Apart from situational and institutional conditions, they endeavor to know their preferences. It is the condition of risk which deviate them from their course of practice. This second type of role script brings CA and role theory together and form it theory of communicative action (TCA), to better understand actor's role in condition of uncertainty. For such actor dependent role script there are some

variables; what are the pattern of their national interest, their outer look or worldview or direction of values which might produce such role script in which there is space for CA. For this purpose, it leads to two-dimensional variable namely interest based on rationalism and values based on morality. From rationalism point of view, the focus is on structural incentive to actors. In the face of incentives, the question is which method they are likely to use either coercive or persuasive method in order to realize their preferences. Persuasion method may be used in the form of speech act or manipulation but in a different way, when the target audience does not in the desired way then CA may be the only way to achieve it. From moral perspective, behavior of actors is the result of long historical path through which they traveled. As a result, this path is the culmination of different moral principles which have occupied the important if not dominant part in the shared role script and influence the actor to take part in the CA. In this case, there is no absence of interest but mounted and elucidate according to role script and identity.

Possibility of role change in role script:

The idea of change is the major issue between role theory and Theory of Communicative action. As mentioned earlier that role is considered static under the influence of structure on actor's part. In contrast, CA give the actor leverage to change the mood of social reality in which they live. There are four such ways to do so. First, role scripts are ambivalent in nature. As long as they are not developed to some hard-core rituals, they still have the capacity to reinterpret. Not only they could be revived but also have the capacity to deal with its role conflict. That's why this study suggest that not only Musharraf reinterpret the role of Pakistan as country in the face of War on terror, but also depend it. Second, there is hardship when actor lies between ego part of

role (own political culture) and alter-expectation (systemic environment). This is again evident from this study the position taken by Pakistan, which on the one hand prefer determined steps towards “Anti-Terrorism Agent” role script but sense correspondingly obliged to deal with domestic role contestation. Third, due to changing circumstance actors are compelled to adopt new role script. As the element of structure, roles are thus considered stable. However, the world is dynamic and with changing environment, new roles provide new opportunities and may be new restriction. If they followed the old script in the new environment, they may be failed. This point again justifies this study, when Pakistan in the Musharraf era is case of point, Of course, the event of 9/11 was a decisive moment, which changed the entire international environment. Externally new demands have arisen, Pakistan was pressurized to participate in the military operation against alleged perpetrators. Also the issue was whether the new role would be that of an ally to fight against terrorism, a faithful ally of an anti-American forces, or an active independent actor. Such historic variations demand a new domestic understanding how the state's role should be comprehended. In such a scenario, it is expected to apply CA in internal environment, at least at the policy making elite level, to find out choices, consider possibilities, and describe novel guidelines of suitability. On alternative note the possibility of other domestic actors with hard core material resources to impose or trying to push forward their desired agenda is not denied. Rather, in the face of uncertainty and insecurity, what is expected to arrive on mutual agreement to reorient the new role in the new world, and this was what Musharraf trying to do.

And finally, regular change in role script is possible in divided political nations. In such nations there is present different and

rival social and political forces who hold diverse role conception and identities. Pakistan easily fit in such political system. There is no consensual identity and coherent role conception. Thus, dramatic role shift can be expected.

Pakistan and the role of Anti-terrorism Agent; Conceptualizing the enactment of such role

This study is in the limelight of time period in the aftermath of attacks on 11th, September 2001 in United States of America, for this reason, the focus is related to such timeframe. As in the role theory case study is the mostly used method to study any state's role behavior, so the selection of data material is also defined according to it which mostly relied on official statements of policy making ruling elites. The official statements include speeches, interviews, parliamentary debate mean any available material in the secondary form of data set. It is noteworthy that data material which entirely cover official statements is used to analyze how it changes role. This focus on the official statements alone does not mean that other sources of role contestation is not existent or have no role in role contestation process but to limit analysis is guided by four factors mentioned above; first due to changing nature of role and Musharraf as unitary actor all this particular time, though he takes policy inputs from other sources, would have more chances to rewrite the new role script. Second, Pakistan as country has to overcome the hardship faced due to internal role demand and external role expectation compel the leadership to deal with two fronts significant role deliberation. Third, due to defining moment, the incident of 9/11 compels the leadership in Pakistan to think how they view themselves in changing environment. And finally, Pakistan political culture provide opportunity to the leadership to regenerate the new official role for country and it is also

proven by historical account of the country. Material was accessed through internet, perhaps the most useful sources was the website of Musharraf- our leader which contains a lot of his speeches and interviews from 12 October 1999 to 18 August 2008. It is important to mention that the time under investigation was predominantly captured by General Pervaiz Musharraf in political sense, therefore, bias remained in data collection. For this reason, the chapter will not stick to one source but include other sources as well which will help out to understand his role reenactment process. These other sources may be online available English and Urdu material (material in Urdu is translated by the author).

Solving role ambiguity

In his autobiography, In the line of fire, Musharraf first depicted how this dreadful event was circulating on screen, then supported by a lot of documented evidence that this erroneous act was done by Al-Qaeda, a terrorist organization, who are the guest of Taliban regime which was located in the neighborhood of Pakistan. This description will shed light on many themes, firstly, in the wake of these events Pakistan have to solve role ambiguity as state, second, the management of role conflict, third, alter expectation need new role script. And finally, how to overcome domestic role contestation. On important note Pakistan previously, pursuing the role of faithful ally to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. However, after attacks it deviate from this role and sought a new role of anti-terrorism agent in which apparently it leaves the old ally (Afghan Taliban) and joined the new one (United States, despite of what the mutual relation is called “roller coaster rider” (Siddiqi, 2009) (throughout history) in his joint adventures. In order to understand the revival of role script we have to understand the old one. Historically, Pakistan identity was

(re)defined by conservative forces dominantly by Islamic forces, on practical ground Pakistan character as Islamic state is debatable, however, in nation building its manifestation is consistent feature. This ideology with its concepts of ‘Ummah’ and brotherhood especially Muslim brotherhood provided role conception of faithful ally to the Taliban in Afghanistan prior to 9/11. Moreover, Pakistan at the time was also pursuing the role of active-independent as well, this role was the need of hour as US stopped economic and military aid in the post-cold war era. Meanwhile, condemned Pakistan nuclear tests, and showed disapproval of installation of military regime after 1999 military coup. Even, not make sure the delivery of fighter jets F-16, despite the payment of them. In the backdrop of such role script, it made necessary for Pakistan at least to reinvestigate its role script in the face on new realities.

Reorientation of role

Official response about the attacks was the president Musharraf address to the nation on Sep 19th, 2001. The speech was a policy statement in which role reorientation was indicated. He echoed “Pakistan is facing a very critical situation and I believe that after 1971, this is the most critical period. If we make wrong decisions in this crisis, it can lead to the very worse consequences. On the other hand, if we take right decisions, its results will be good. The negative consequences can endanger Pakistan's integrity and solidarity. Our critical concerns, our important concerns can come under threat”. The statement reflected deliberation for change, by using historical analogy he compared the current situation with its precedent in historical past and emphasized the notion if we have to not repeat the history, we have to change the script. Moreover, he also highlights, the position of ego ‘the negative consequences can endanger Pakistan's integrity and solidarity’ if it does

otherwise in the face of alter expectation. At the moment the new role script lies in the ‘right decision’ with it, ‘we can re-emerge politically as a responsible and dignified nation and all our difficulties can be minimized. However, this change in role script is not easy as it seems, admittedly, Pakistani society was highly polarized in its political culture, but it doesn’t mean that reorientation in the role script is an easy task. For this purpose, Musharraf need some solid ground on which he justified this new role script. He identified the real threat in the familiar enemy, thus in his address he articulated India poised the real damage:

“Let’s look at our neighbors. They have promised US all cooperation. They want to isolate us, get us declared a terrorist state. They have met in Dushanbe with some other countries and plan to try and install anti Pakistani government in Afghanistan. So, our neighbor is busy trying to harm us. If you see their television, they are busy with propaganda against us.” Pakistan and India rivalry are a historical fact, the nation psych in this regard is always new, if not then they have to remain that what India have done in the past is expected again. At this historical juncture India cooperation with United States in every way reflect her ambitions to isolate Pakistan particularly on US side and generally in international community. Moreover, his tone was not just political one, he explicitly switches to religious rhetoric, by declaring Pakistan an Islamic country (righteous) while India as Hindu (evil). And once again reminded the nature of issue between Pakistan and India is not just political one but also religious one. In order to make role coherence, he implicitly maintained this Indian notion throughout his September,2001 speech. This initial effort was successful in its role revival as Pakistan take first step as anti-terrorism agent by providing America a limited number of airbases and other logistical support. The

second source of threat emerged from its once faithful ally Taliban. The revival of this role again needed a solid ground on which to justify role shift. This shift was gradual and implicit, for example, in the same speech of his September 19th, 2001, Musharraf first showed concerned about the well-being and survival of this faithful ally and then gradually rejecting the notion that they are related to Pakistan and Islam in any way. Previously, it was mentioned that Pakistan support for Taliban was in the Islamic concepts such as Muslim brotherhood, now role change was some sort of rejection of their idea of Islam. To avoid role ambiguity or domestic role rejection first, the natural bond between Islam and Pakistan was emphasized. Pakistan was declared a fort of Islam and suggested that danger to Pakistan mean danger to Islam. Then, on the bases of this claim delinking the relationship of Islam and Pakistan with Taliban. To further strengthen this idea of Pakistan and Islam as unitary entity he used another Islamic analogy in order to express wisdom, in Urdu language word ‘Basirat or Hikmat’ has more power connotation, first pave the way for right decision, then express the form of such decision which lies in the historical event of Prophet’s decision to migrate from Makkah to Medina. This analogy has significance in the face of this event to show resemblance between state role shift with the event of migration. Moreover, this shift in role apparently reflects state weakness but if we connect it to the example of holy prophet was actually guided by ‘basirat’ which was the ultimate result of Islam survival. Thus, the audience has provided the cue if we favor our former ally or faithful ally then we will put Pakistan/Islam in danger. Subsequently, it reinforced the notion that disassociation from the fateful ally is guided by this exercise of ‘hikmat’. So, such is not the time to indulge in emotion when there is a looming crisis, rather, we should prefer rationality in the

place of it and take a strategic decision. Nevertheless, his both ideas whether strategic decision or using of hikmat doesn’t mean to abandon Islam, rather, this notion retrieve the survival and continuation of Islam ensured by Pakistan in the sub-continent. We earlier discussed that role script provided the intersubjective place to the actor to revive role script. In this section first we will discuss how he achieve such intersubjective position. Then with it help of it how he is in a position to change role script. He began the first speech to co-operation with the America and abandoning the faithful ally was guided by wisdom which Almighty bestowed upon him. This put him in a state where he attributes his change in rational guided by divine power. This was also challenge on his part to those who thought of themselves as the custodian of Islam mean Islamic scholars or Mullahs. He warned those who considered themselves as authority on Islam that there is someone else (mean Allah) who whenever want to give authority or honor he wishes. Moreover, he is placed by almighty in such a position and whatever he is doing in such a capacity is righteous guided by that divine authority, and Pakistan should keep faith and confidence on his deeds. This suggested that he is a wise leader which is guided in his wisdom by divine power by almighty Allah. To further strengthen his position, he also used his historical lineage with the holy prophet. He called himself Syed and also depicted what it meant to be a Syed. He said that whenever he visited the holy place of Makkah, he got the honor to visit the inner door of Ka’ba which is called ‘Tuba” and raised the slogan of Allah’s greatness, in Arabic Allah-o-Akbar mean Allah is great, such is the place where Hazart Bilal (R.A) called the people for prayer. Even, the door of holy prophet’s tomb shrine was opened for him as he visited to Medina. Perhaps, the significant effect of this was that it enables him to portray himself as authority over which is Islamic or not,

moreover, gave him to perform speech act in more legitimize way which was not possible before it. It is also indicated by data that faithful ally was not at once replaced rather the process was slow and steady, first he paved his way to challenge their authoritative position on Islam, then make sure his position to represent himself as legitimate representer of Islam. Moreover, this denunciation was not immediate, instead he strengthens his position in the context of 9/11 attacks. More important was his image which initially does not place him in the authoritative position in order to speak in such a capacity, for which he first of all made position for himself then from that position he denounces his faithful ally.

This construction of ego part in its distinctive identity enabled him to make differentiation from alter part, by which he knows what right decision is and most importantly provide an opportunity to define the problem of state. This construction played its important role is such a way to place Musharraf to distract state role behaviour toward US led GWOT and ensure that the real war is between Islam one represented by Taliban and other by Pakistan. The ruling elite is fighting such a war which is between good and evil forces.

Role conflict (Resolving ego role conception and alter role expectation)

Further on, in continuation of efforts he drew attention to his accomplishments, mainly his idea of what role theorist called ‘beacon of light’. This was the symbolic representation of glorious past which he resembles to the past of Islam which showed new avenues to humanity in its progress and advancement, same is true about his leadership which put Pakistan in such a footstep in order to secure international recognition and fame. On internal front, Musharraf forecast himself in a such role which make him legitimate liberator because

he has international reputation. The basic idea is that general public accept his thinking and practices which emerged from such thoughts. His indication of organization of Islamic countries was make sure the Muslim community is with his side. Musharraf said that his principal motive was to take Ummah in better direction, this was an effort on his behalf to portray himself as leader of Ummah, not just a leader who only is the leader of Pakistan. such representation is evident on many occasions supported by the data through which he wanted to make his role as Muslim leader. For domestic audience, providing such clue was an effort on his part to make an identity of a leader which has Islamic credential and caliph like legitimacy. The point here is not that masses accept his identity rather the role through this identity in such a capacity he will be able to deny the Islamic identity of his faithful ally (Taliban) and the role played by them in such identity. In addition, the attempt to make Musharraf identity as God gifted and guided leader, the efforts was also to devise Pakistan as state in his identity a reasonable and responsible actor. The basic idea behind such identity formation was to construct a role which was different from alter part in its rational. Such implicit and explicit identity formation of alter as irrational serve the political purpose in which such rational is attribute one’s own identity. Also, the Pakistani state identity as a responsible state negate the irresponsible role behaviour assigned to alter, namely the United States and India. There is clear distinction that state’s ego part seldom even if it is intentionally representing their role as irresponsible or irrational actor, they mostly put their weight on alter as irresponsible and irrational.

Adaptation of the new role in the changing environment

If one looks to post 9/11 political scenario, the literature suggested that in its role behaviour Pakistan is clearly indicated as

sensible actor. Such role behaviour, of course, contradict the role in which Pakistan was rejected by the primary socializer especially the US in the post-cold war era by imposing sanction and tilt toward Indian side. Nevertheless, on important note, Pakistan role behaviour before 9/11 also showed indication that it was eager to distance itself from any role enactment which portray it as rouge state. Musharraf’s entry into the political scene in 1999 after a military coup try to convince both domestic and external audience on his new role aspirations in which internally, he promised to save the country from financial collapse and externally act as responsible state.

Once Pakistan adopted the anti-terrorism agent role, in such capacity it provided airbases, flights permission, logistical support, diplomatic interchange, sharing of intelligence, and frequent visits of official between Pakistan and America. Despite of the much-anticipated hype by Western media of mass protests against this role of anti-terrorism agent witness lack of demonstration and opposition. According to many writers, the reaction was low and even wiped out. Mainstream parties unanimously supported government in its role as anti-terrorism agent role while religious parties was angry. They organized mass protests in which they burn the US flag, but their impact was little as major portion of the population did not participate in order to pressurize the government to change its policy. The popularity of General Pervaiz Musharraf was intact and widespread throughout this period He remained popular in the backyard of this war on terror until 2007 and gradual decline in his position started with his decision of the dismal Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The claim is denied that is entirely possible that the foreign policy role behaviour was overall successful in the legitimization of this role of anti-terrorism agent however it is certain that to some extent it provides

consensus in domestic role contestation in the aftermath of 9/11.

Conclusion

President Pervaiz Musharraf was given a clear ultimatum by the United States government on 12 September 2001 to choose his side either with terrorist or against them. Pakistan’s leadership had already decided its course of action to join the side of US and allies against the perpetrators. According to the autobiography of Musharraf he was afraid of domestic reaction especially the reaction of religious groups. Strong reaction was also expected in adject area of border but overall despite of such expectation the reaction was low to nothing. This lack of public outrage provided the ground and interest to this study. This provides the area of interest to this project to anticipate the possibility of an overall identity revival which help out in the role location process with the wider consensus of domestic role contestation to enact the role of anti-terrorism agent in the war on terror.

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